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           ABSTRACT 
 Research into two-stage models of “free will” – first “free” random generation of alternative 
possibilities, followed by “willed” adequately determined decisions consistent with character, 
values, and desires – suggests  that William James was in 1884 the first of a dozen philosophers 
and scientists to propose such a two-stage model for free will.  We review the later work to 
establish James’s priority. 
 
By limiting chance to the generation of alternative possibilities, James was the first to overcome 
the standard two-part argument against free will, i.e., that the will is either determined or 
random. James gave it elements of both, to establish freedom but preserve responsibility. We 
show that James was influenced by Darwin’s model of natural selection, as were most recent 
thinkers with a two-stage model. 
 
In view of James’s famous decision to make his first act of freedom a choice to believe that his 
will is free, it is most fitting to celebrate James’s priority in the free will debates by naming the 
two-stage model – first chance, then choice -“Jamesian” free will. 
 
 
THE DECLINE OF DETERMINISM 
In the nineteenth century, according to historians of science1 and philosopher Ian 
Hacking2, there was a “rise in statistical thinking” and an “erosion of determinism.”  The strict 
physical determinism implied by Isaac Newton’s classical mechanics was giving way to the 
statistical mechanics of physicists James Clerk Maxwell and Ludwig Boltzmann, who assumed 
that gases were composed of atoms and molecules moving at random and following statistical 
laws.  
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In the United States, William James’s colleague Charles Sanders Peirce followed these 
developments. Peirce was a superb logician and mathematician who mastered probability and 
statistics. He gave us the name “normal distribution” for the law of errors in scientific 
measurements.  He knew that that inevitable errors in physical measurements meant that that the 
deterministic laws of nature could never be proved logically necessary.3 
Peirce developed the idea of randomness as a key element of his philosophy. He called it 
“Tychism” (after tyche, the Greek word for chance). 
The ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus had suggested4 that random swerves in the 
otherwise deterministic motions of the atoms provided room for human freedom. But Epicurus’ 
notion of chance as an explanation for free will was ridiculed by the Stoics, the leading 
philosophers of his time.  If determinism deprives us of freedom, indeterminism or chance as the 
source of action denies us responsibility for our actions. 
With so much talk of probability in the nineteenth century, it was becoming more 
respectable to discuss the possibility of absolute chance. Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution 
included chance variations that could be inherited by an organism’s offspring to allow the natural 
selection of new species. Genuine novelty in the universe needs chance to generate those new 
possibilities. Otherwise, the existing species would be the predetermined consequence of laws of 
nature and events in the distant past. 
James and Peirce followed the Darwinian arguments closely. Peirce was undoubtedly 
more familiar than James with the statistical arguments of the physicists.  Peirce’s main attack 
was on the idea of logical and necessary truths about the physical world. Peirce was the strongest 
philosophical voice for absolute chance since Epicurus. He argued that chance liberated the will 
from determinism, but he gave no definite model, and in the end he compromised and wanted to 
manage and control the chance with a form of rationality that he called “synechism” or 
continuity.  He dreamed of “evolutionary love” and a God who kept the creative element of 
chance in check. 
Peirce was inspired by Hegel’s notion of logic and arranged his arguments in triads, often 
with Hegel's thesis-antithesis-synthesis structure.5 Thus, Peirce’s idea of evolution has three 
levels, the Darwinian (Tychism - random and indeterminate), the Spencerian (Necessity - 
mechanical and determinate), and Peirce's own (Synechism  - union of the two first levels).6 







Peirce was morally ambiguous about unbridled chance. Although he was the champion of 
chance, he thought it purposeless. He called Darwinian evolution “greedy.”  
Although Peirce is famous for promoting the reality of chance with his Tychism, his 
overall opinion of chance was negative. We shall see that it is William James who in the end 
found a measured and constructive role for chance in his attempt to defend freedom of the will. 
Where Peirce saw chance as a negative force, James, like Darwin, saw it as a creative one. 
 
VIEWS ON FREE WILL BEFORE JAMES 
Before James, most philosophers, especially those with theological training, held a dualist 
view of free will, in which freedom was God’s gift to humanity, a gift that operated in a mind 
outside the physical universe, for example in Immanuel Kant’s noumenal world beyond the 
deterministic phenomenal world. 
But ever since the seventeenth-century secular arguments of Thomas Hobbes, a 
significant number of materialist philosophers denied such a libertarian free will. They became 
“compatibilists” who argued that “voluntary” actions are compatible with strict logical and 
physical determinism.  Hobbes said “the cause of the will is not the will itself, but something else 
not in his own disposing.” He said “voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes and 
therefore are necessitated.”7 For Hobbes, talk of free agents was nonsense - if free means 
uncaused and random.  
 
I hold that ordinary definition of a free agent, namely that a free agent is that 
which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can 
nevertheless not produce it, implies a contradiction and is nonsense.8 
 
The “voluntarism” of Hobbes and David Hume identified freedom as the absence of external 
coercive causes.  It was freedom of action, not freedom of the will. Though the will be 
determined, as long as the will is one of the causes in the great causal chain, that would be 
enough freedom for them.  They found “free will” to be compatible even with a complete 
predeterminism since the beginning of time. 
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For Hume, the necessity of causality was found in the human mind,  
 
there is but one kind of necessity, as there is but one kind of cause… 'Tis the 
constant conjunction of objects, along with the determination of the mind, which 
constitutes a physical necessity: And the removal of these is the same thing with 
chance. As objects must either be conjoin'd or not, and as the mind must either be 
determin'd or not to pass from one object to another, 'tis impossible to admit of 
any medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity.9 
 
 
WILLIAM JAMES’S ATTACK ON HOBBES-HUME COMPATIBILISM 
In his 1884 address to Harvard Divinity Students in Lowell Lecture Hall,10 James 
famously coined the terms "hard determinism" and "soft determinism," by which he meant the 
compatibilism of Hobbes and Hume. Hard determinists simply deny the existence of free will 
altogether. 
 
Old-fashioned determinism was what we may call hard determinism. It did not 
shrink from such words as fatality, bondage of the will, necessitation, and the like. 
Nowadays, we have a soft determinism which abhors harsh words, and, 
repudiating fatality, necessity, and even predetermination, says that its real name 
is freedom; for freedom is only necessity understood, and bondage to the highest 
is identical with true freedom.11 
 
James called “soft determinism” a “quagmire of evasion.”12  Immanuel Kant had called it a 
“wretched subterfuge” and “word jugglery.”)13 And whether it is “hard” or it is “soft,” James 
said that determinism 
 
professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and 
decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous possibilities 
hidden in its womb; the part we call the present is compatible with only one 
totality. Any other future complement than the one fixed from eternity is 
impossible. The whole is in each and every part, and welds it with the rest into an 







absolute unity, an iron block, in which there can be no equivocation or shadow of 
turning.14 
 
He argued instead for "indeterminism."   
 
Indeterminism, on the contrary, says that the parts have a certain amount of loose 
play on one another, so that the laying down of one of them does not necessarily 
determine what the others shall be. It admits that possibilities may be in excess of 
actualities, and that things not yet revealed to our knowledge may really in 
themselves be ambiguous. Of two alternative futures which we conceive, both 
may now be really possible; and the one becomes impossible only at the very 
moment when the other excludes it by becoming real itself.15 
 
The stronghold of the determinist argument is the antipathy to the idea of 
chance...This notion of alternative possibility, this admission that any one of 
several things may come to pass is, after all, only a roundabout name for chance.16 
 
THE ANTIPATHY TO CHANCE 
 
How strong is this antipathy to chance among determinists?  
The Stoic Chrysippus said that a single uncaused cause could destroy the universe 
(cosmos),  
 
Everything that happens is followed by something else which depends on it by 
causal necessity. Likewise, everything that happens is preceded by something 
with which it is causally connected. For nothing exists or has come into being in 
the cosmos without a cause. The universe will be disrupted and disintegrate into 
pieces and cease to be a unity functioning as a single system, if any uncaused 
movement is introduced into it.17 
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John Fiske, a contemporary of James, described the absurd decisions that would be made 
if chance were real, 
 
If volitions arise without cause, it necessarily follows that we cannot infer from 
them the character of the antecedent states of feeling. .. . The mother may strangle 
her first-born child, the miser may cast his long-treasured gold into the sea, the 
sculptor may break in pieces his lately-finished statue, in the presence of no other 
feelings than those which before led them to cherish, to hoard, and to create.18 
 
Some twentieth-century philosophers hold an equally negative view of chance.  
 
The fallacy of [incompatibilism] has often been exposed and the clearest proof 
that it is mistaken or at least muddled lies in showing that I could not be free to 
choose what I do unless determinism is correct. For the simplest actions could not 
be performed in an indeterministic universe. If I decide, say, to eat a piece of fish, 
I cannot do so if the fish is liable to turn into a stone or to disintegrate in mid-air 
or to behave in any other utterly unpredictable manner.19 
 
THE TWO-STAGE MODEL OF WILLIAM JAMES 
 
The genius of the Jamesian picture of free will is that indeterministic chance is the source 
for what James calls “ambiguous possibilities” and “alternative futures.”  The chance generation 
of such alternative possibilities for action does not in any way limit his choice to one of them. 
Chance is not the direct cause of actions.  James makes it clear that it is his choice that “grants 
consent” to one of them. 
In his 1884 lecture The Dilemma of Determinism,20 James asked some Harvard Divinity 
School students to consider his choice for walking home after his talk. 
 
What is meant by saying that my choice of which way to walk home after the 
lecture is ambiguous and matter of chance?...It means that both Divinity Avenue 







and Oxford Street are called but only one, and that one either one, shall be 
chosen.21 
 
This notion of alternative possibility, this admission that any one of several things 
may come to pass is, after all, only a roundabout name for chance.22 
 
With this simple example, James was to my knowledge the first thinker to enunciate clearly a 
two-stage decision process, with chance in a present time of random alternatives, leading to a 
choice which grants consent to one possibility and transforms an equivocal ambiguous future 
into an unalterable and simple past. He describes a temporal sequence of undetermined 
alternative possibilities followed by an adequately determined choice where chance is no longer 
a factor. 
James also asked the students to imagine his actions repeated in exactly the same 
circumstances, a condition which is regarded today as one of the great challenges to libertarian 
free will. In the following passage, James anticipates much of modern philosophical modal 
reasoning and physical theories of multiple universes. 
 
Imagine that I first walk through Divinity Avenue, and then imagine that the 
powers governing the universe annihilate ten minutes of time with all that it 
contained, and set me back at the door of this hall just as I was before the choice 
was made. Imagine then that, everything else being the same, I now make a 
different choice and traverse Oxford Street. You, as passive spectators, look on 
and see the two alternative universes,--one of them with me walking through 
Divinity Avenue in it, the other with the same me walking through Oxford Street. 
Now, if you are determinists you believe one of these universes to have been from 
eternity impossible: you believe it to have been impossible because of the intrinsic 
irrationality or accidentality somewhere involved in it. But looking outwardly at 
these universes, can you say which is the impossible and accidental one, and 
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which the rational and necessary one? I doubt if the most ironclad determinist 
among you could have the slightest glimmer of light on this point.23 
 
James’s two-stage model effectively separates chance (the indeterministic free element) 
from choice (an arguably determinate decision that follows causally from one’s character, values, 
and especially feelings and desires at the moment of decision).  
Note that compatibilists (James’s “soft determinists”) should be pleased that the second 
stage of the model is completely consistent with the compatibilist view that determination is 
required for free will and inconceivable without it.24 
 
In The Principles of Psychology, James asked where the alternative possibilities for 
action come from?  From past experiences, he says, initially involuntary and random. From 
observing the experiences of others, also the results of chance, we build up a stock of 
possibilities in our memory.  
 
We learn all our possibilities by the way of experience. When a particular 
movement, having once occurred in a random, reflex, or involuntary way, has left 
an image of itself in the memory, then the movement can be desired again, 
proposed as an end, and deliberately willed.25 
 
A supply of ideas of the various movements that are possible left in the memory by 
experiences of their involuntary performance is thus the first prerequisite of the 
voluntary life. 26 [emphasis in original] 
 
In 1880 James had suggested a strong similarity between genetic evolution and the 
evolution of ideas.  
 
A remarkable parallel, which I think has never been noticed, obtains between the 
facts of social evolution on the one hand, and of zoölogical evolution as 
expounded by Mr. Darwin on the other. 27 
 







[In mental evolution], if anywhere, it would seem at first sight as if that school 
must be right which makes the mind passively plastic, and the environment 
actively productive of the form and order of its conceptions...It might, 
accordingly, seem as if there were no room for any agency other than this…as if, 
in a word, the parallel with Darwinism might no longer obtain... 
 
But, in spite of all these facts, I have no hesitation whatever in holding firm to the 
Darwinian distinction even here. I maintain that the facts in question are all drawn 
from the lower strata of the mind, so to speak. 
 
And I can easily show...that as a matter of fact the new conceptions, emotions, 
and active tendencies which evolve are originally produced in the shape of 
random images, fancies, accidental out-births of spontaneous variation in the 
functional activity of the excessively instable human brain.”28 
 
Thus James sees the origin of new thoughts and actions in the “accidental and 
spontaneous variations” which put “random images” in the memory, where in a second stage 
they can be “proposed as an end, and deliberately willed.”  Robert J. Richards thinks Darwin 
himself would not have approved of James’s use of his theory to defend free will.  Richards says 
Darwin “was fully persuaded that human mental behavior was completely determined.”29 




THE TEMPORARY ECLIPSE OF WILLIAM JAMES PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Shortly after his death in 1910, the rise of behaviorism in America put most of the work 
in James’s Principles of Psychology off limits. Consciousness, will, feelings, motives, desires, 
purposes, and plans were all deemed unobservable by the objective, third-party, standards of 
modern science.  Where once introspection was seen as a powerful tool (and it was perhaps 
                                                                          BOB DOYLE                                                                        
10        
James’s most powerful tool), it was now attacked as unverifiable “introspectionism.” The proper 
study of psychology was now based entirely on external observations of visible behavior. The 
mind was now a black box.  Consciousness and free will became taboo topics in academic 
departments. 
Even in the 1960’s, when cognitive science replaced behaviorism, the new materialist and 
physicalist models of mind had no place for metaphysical discussions of the mind-body problem. 
The concept of consciousness was thought too confused to be of any help in models of the mind 
as a computer.  
But the last few decades has seen a resurgence of interest in the thoughts of William 
James.  Bernard Baars, the theoretical neurobiologist and author of the leading textbook on 
Consciousness31 says: 
 
By wide consent the foremost work on human mental processes, even today, is 
William James's Principles of Psychology, which appeared in 1890. The 
Principles offers thirteen hundred pages of inspired dialogue on the major topics 
of psychology. Building on fifty years of European studies, it has given us classic 
descriptions of selective attention, mental imagery, hypnosis, habit and effortful 
concentration, the stream of consciousness, the basic arguments for and against 
unconscious processes, a theory of voluntary control and impulsiveness, the 
crucial distinction between self-as-subject and self-as-object, and much more. On 
many of these topics James's thinking is fully up to date, and it is embarrassing 
but true that much of the time he is still ahead of the scientific curve. Entire 
research domains have been inspired by single passages in the Principles.32 
 
Although James discusses free will only briefly in the Principles, (pp.569-79), he directed 
readers to “the grounds of his opinion” in his 1884 lecture on the Dilemma of Determinism 
referenced above.  We hope to show that in that work James was “well ahead of the curve” in 
providing a limited indeterminism as the source of creative alternative possibilities leading to 
ambiguous futures. 
 
JOHN LOCKE’S SEPARATION OF FREE FROM WILL 
 








First, we must note that, centuries earlier, John Locke had made a strong case for 
separating the idea of freedom from the determinate will.  For Locke and his contemporaries, 
notions of freedom and liberty were often associated with randomness and libertine chance. 
In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke calls the question of Freedom of the Will 
unintelligible.  But for Locke, it is only because the adjective "free" applies more properly to the 
agent, not to the will, which is determined by the mind, and determines the action. 
In Book II, Chapter XXI, On Power, section 14, Locke argues   
 
I leave it to be considered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long 
agitated, and, I think, unreasonable, because unintelligible question, viz. Whether 
man's will be free or no? For if I mistake not, it follows from what I have said, 
that the question itself is altogether improper; and it is as insignificant to ask 
whether man's will be free, as to ask whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue 
square: liberty being as little applicable to the will, as swiftness of motion is to 
sleep, or squareness to virtue. Every one would laugh at the absurdity of such a 
question…and when any one well considers it, I think he will as plainly perceive 
that liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an 
attribute or modification of the will, which is also but a power.33 
 
In sections 16 and 18, he elaborates 
 
It is plain then that the will is nothing but one power or ability, and freedom 
another power or ability - so that, to ask, whether the will has freedom, is to ask 
whether one power has another power, one ability another ability; a question at 
first sight too grossly absurd to make a dispute, or need an answer.34  
 
This way of talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and, as I guess, produced great 
confusion.35 
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Locke’s warning of confusion in this “way of talking,” a popular phrase with analytic 
language philosophers from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Richard Rorty, might have alerted language 
philosophers to the proper “dis-solution” of the “pseudo-problem” of free will. 36 Simply 
separate the “free” from the “will!” It’s the agent that is free - as a consequence of genuine 
alternative possibilities to choose from. 
In section 21, Locke concludes,  
 
I think the question is not proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be 
free. Thus, I think, 
 
First, That so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring 
the existence of any action to the non-existence of that action, and vice versa, 
make it to exist or not exist, so far he is free. For if I can, by a thought directing 
the motion of my finger, make it move when it was at rest, or vice versa, it is 
evident, that in respect of that I am free…and as far as this power reaches, of 
acting or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, so 
far is a man free. For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to 
do what he will?... So that in respect of actions within the reach of such a power 
in him, a man seems as free as it is possible for freedom to make him.37 
 
The two-stage  model of James, which also separates “free” from “will,”  might have 
pleased Locke, excepting that Locke might not accept chance as the source of possibilities. 
 
 
THE STANDARD ARGUMENT AGAINST FREE WILL 
 
Perhaps the most important insight in the Jamesian model is that chance is not the direct 
cause of action, that chance does not make the will itself indeterminate. There is in the will 
adequate determinism, though that does not mean predeterminism. The causal chain of events 
stops at James generation of ambiguous futures.  








The classical argument against free will is to describe the problem logically as the horns 
of a dilemma, on one side determinism (really predeterminism), on the other side chance, both of 
which imperil moral responsibility. 
Given the stark choice between these exclusive options, it is plain why most philosophers 
are compatibilists and opt for determinism. Some determinism is necessary for the determination 
of our actions by our reasons.  The idea that our actions are random is patently absurd. 
James’s contemporary John Fiske wrote, “Volitions are either caused or they are not. If they are 
not caused, an inexorable logic brings us to the absurdities just mentioned. If they are caused, the 
free-will doctrine is annihilated.”38 
By limiting chance to the generation of alternative possibilities, James was the first to 
overcome the standard argument against libertarian free will found in the writings of many of the 
recent participants in the free will debates.39 Instead of a stark choice between chance and 
determinism, Jamesian two-stage models involve both some chance and some limited 
determinism. Some chance is needed to break the causal chain of strict logical and physical 
predeterminism. But some determination is also needed to protect the will from the charge that 
our decisions are random.  Decisions must be adequately determined by a process that considers 
reasons, motives, and feelings when evaluating the alternative possibilities that have been 
generated in part by chance. 
James accomplishes this by using chance simply to create genuinely new and 
unpredictable alternative possibilities for action, following which a choice can be made by a will 
that is consistent with character, values, and especially with one’s desires and feelings, which 
James considered an essential part of the will. 
 
 
THE STRANGE CASE OF R. E. HOBART 
 
R. E. Hobart is the pseudonym of Dickinson S. Miller, a student of William James who 
was later one of his closest personal friends and for some years a colleague in the Harvard 
philosophy department.  Miller criticized the core idea of The Will to Believe, namely that it was 
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acceptable to hold religious faith in the absence of evidence for or against that faith. James 
referred to Miller as "my most penetrating critic and intimate enemy."40 
Nearly twenty-five years after James’s death, under the name R. E. Hobart, Miller 
published a short article in Mind41 in 1934 that is mistakenly considered one of the definitive 
statements of determinism and compatibilism.  Despite being widely cited as showing that free 
will requires determinism,42 Hobart explicitly does not endorse strict logical or physical 
determinism, and he explicitly does endorse the existence of alternative possibilities, which he 
says can depend on absolute chance. Remember that Hobart is writing about six years after the 
discovery of quantum indeterminacy. He says: 
 
I am not maintaining that determinism is true...it is not here affirmed that there are 
no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute 
chance.43 
  
We say, ‘I can will this or I can will that, whichever I choose.’ Two courses of 
action present themselves to my mind. I think of their consequences, I look on this 
picture and on that, one of them commends itself more than the other, and I will 
an act that brings it about. I knew that I could choose either. That means that I had 
the power to choose either. 44 
 
Note that where Hobart describes alternative possibilities as “presenting themselves” (this 
was also James’s terminology), he attacks raw indeterminism as the direct cause of actions. 
Thoughts come to us freely, actions come from us willfully. 
 
In proportion as an act of volition starts of itself without cause it is exactly, so far 
as the freedom of the individual is concerned, as if it had been thrown into his 
mind from without — ‘suggested’ to him — by a freakish demon. It is exactly 
like it in this respect, that in neither case does the volition arise from what the 
man is, cares for or feels allegiance to; it does not come out of him. In proportion 
as it is undetermined, it is just as if his legs should suddenly spring up and carry 
him off where he did not prefer to go. Far from constituting freedom, that would 
mean, in the exact measure in which it took place, the loss of freedom.45 









What is strange is that this clear two-stage model following William James’s ideas should 





LATER TWO-STAGE MODELS 
 
As far as we know, James was the only thinker with a two-stage model for free will in the 
nineteenth century.  While the ancient materialist Epicurus may have had something similar in 
mind, his writings are not preserved well enough for us to know. 
In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries ten more philosophers and scientists, 
somewhat independent of one another, devised similar two-stage models that separate “free” 
from “will.” Were they aware of James’s pioneering view? They all could have read James’s 
famous essay on the subject. And no doubt most were familiar with the landmark Hobart article 
in Mind. We review some of their arguments here as evidence that William James was once 
again “ahead of the curve” as a thinker on this most ancient of philosophical and psychological 
problems. 
They include the French mathematician and scientist Henri Poincaré (about 1906)46, the 
physicist Arthur Holly Compton (1931, 1955)47, the biologist A.O. Gomes (1960)48, the 
philosopher  Karl Popper (1965, 1977)49, the physicist and philosopher Henry Margenau (1968, 
1982)50, the philosophers Daniel Dennett (1978)51, Robert Kane (1984)52, John Martin Fischer 
(1995)53, and Alfred Mele (1995)54, the psychologist Stephen Kosslyn (2004)55, the 
astrophysicist and philosopher Bob Doyle (2005)56, and most recently, the neurogeneticist 
Martin Heisenberg (2009)57, son of the physicist Werner Heisenberg. 
We look briefly at some of the variations and extensions of the Jamesian model that 
followed the discovery in 1927 of quantum indeterminacy by Werner Heisenberg.  
Astrophysicist Arthur Stanley Eddington claimed in 1928 that indeterminacy marked the end of 
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strict physical determinism. Writing up his Gifford Lectures of 1927, Eddington announced “It is 
a consequence of the advent of the quantum theory that physics is no longer pledged to a scheme 
of deterministic law.” 58 He went even farther and enthusiastically identified indeterminism with 
freedom of the will, but Eddington had no specific model.  In 1935 he said that determinism has 
been “expelled from present-day physics,” he declared, so that “it is no longer necessary to 
suppose that human actions are completely predetermined.”59  
 
 
ARTHUR HOLLY COMPTON (1892-1962) 
 
Compton won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1927, the year that Werner Heisenberg 
discovered quantum indeterminacy. In Science magazine in 1931, Compton endorsed the idea of 
human freedom based on quantum indeterminacy. In his article, Compton invented the notion of 
amplification of microscopic quantum events to bring chance into the macroscopic world. He 
imagined sticks of dynamite attached to his amplifier, anticipating the Schrodinger's Cat 
paradox.60 
Years later, Compton clarified the two-stage nature of his idea – first a range of 
possibilities then a determining choice. 
 
A set of known physical conditions is not adequate to specify precisely what a 
forthcoming event will be. These conditions, insofar as they can be known, define 
instead a range of possible events from among which some particular event will 
occur. When one exercises freedom, by his act of choice he is himself adding a 
factor not supplied by the physical conditions and is thus himself determining 
what will occur. That he does so is known only to the person himself. From the 
outside one can see in his act only the working of physical law. It is the inner 
knowledge that he is in fact doing what he intends to do that tells the actor himself 
that he is free.61 
 
KARL POPPER (1902-1994)   
 








Compton's work was closely read by philosopher Karl Popper, especially when Popper 
was selected to give the first Arthur Holly Compton Memorial Lecture in 1965. Popper at times 
dismissed quantum mechanics as being no help with free will, but in his Compton lecture he 
describes a two-stage model that parallels Darwinian evolution, with genetic mutations being 
probabilistic and involving quantum indeterminacy. 
Popper criticizes the standard argument that chance and determinism exhaust the 
possibilities for free will,  
 
The idea that the only alternative to determinism is just sheer chance was taken 
over by Schlick, together with many of his views on the subject, from Hume, who 
asserted that 'the removal' of what he called 'physical necessity' must always result 
in ‘the same thing with chance. As objects must either be conjoin'd or not, . . . 'tis 
impossible to admit of any medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity.’ 
"Hume's and Schlick's ontological thesis that there cannot exist anything 
intermediate between chance and determinism seems to me not only highly 
dogmatic (not to say doctrinaire) but clearly absurd; and it is understandable only 
on the assumption that they believed in a complete determinism in which chance 
has no status except as a symptom of our ignorance.62  
 
Popper called for a combination of randomness and control to explain freedom, though not yet 
explicitly in two stages with random chance before the controlled decision: "freedom is not just 
chance but, rather, the result of a subtle interplay between something almost random or 
haphazard, and something like a restrictive or selective control." 63 
In his 1977 book with John Eccles, The Self and its Brain, Popper finally formulates the 
two-stage model in a temporal sequence, and makes an explicit comparison with evolution and 
natural selection, 
 
New ideas have a striking similarity to genetic mutations. Now, let us look for a 
moment at genetic mutations. Mutations are, it seems, brought about by quantum 
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theoretical indeterminacy (including radiation effects). Accordingly, they are also 
probabilistic and not in themselves originally selected or adequate, but on them 
there subsequently operates natural selection which eliminates inappropriate 
mutations. Now we could conceive of a similar process with respect to new ideas 
and to free-will decisions, and similar things. 
 
That is to say, a range of possibilities is brought about by a probabilistic and 
quantum mechanically characterized set of proposals, as it were - of possibilities 
brought forward by the brain. On these there then operates a kind of selective 
procedure which eliminates those proposals and those possibilities which are not 
acceptable to the mind.64 
 
In 1977 Popper gave the first Darwin Lecture, at Darwin College, Cambridge. He called it 
Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind. In it he said he had changed his mind (a rare 
admission by a philosopher) about two things. First, he now thought that natural selection was 
not a "tautology" that made it an unfalsifiable theory. Second, he had come to accept the random 
variation and selection of ideas as a promising model of free will and that indeterminism could 
help as the source of variation. 
 The selection of a kind of behavior out of a randomly offered repertoire may be an act of 
free will. I am an indeterminist; and in discussing indeterminism I have often regretfully 
pointed out that quantum indeterminacy does not seem to help us; for the amplification of 
something like, say, radioactive disintegration processes would not lead to human action 
or even animal action, but only to random movements. 
 
I have changed my mind on this issue. A choice process may be a selection process, and 
the selection may be from some repertoire of random events, without being random in its 
turn. This seems to me to offer a promising solution to one of our most vexing problems, 
and one by downward causation.65 
 
DANIEL DENNETT (1942-) 
 








While he remains a confirmed compatibilist, in On Giving Libertarians What They Say 
They Want - Chapter 15 of his 1978 book Brainstorms66 - Tufts philosopher Daniel Dennett 
articulated the case for a two-stage model of free will better than any libertarian. Dennett named 
his model of decision-making "Valerian" after the poet Paul Valery, who took part in a 1936 
conference in Paris with Jacques Hadamard. The conference focused on Henri Poincare’s two-
stage approach to problem solving, in which the unconscious generates random combinations. In 
his book, The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Mind, Hadamard quoted Valery67 (as 
did Dennett later), summarizing the conference opinion, “It takes two to invent anything. The 
one makes up combinations; the other one chooses, recognizes what is important to him in the 
mass of things which the former has imparted to him.”  
Although Valery describes two persons, this is clearly William James’s temporal 
sequence of random chance (“free”) followed by a determining choice (“will”). For James, 
chance and choice are part of a single mind. For this reason and for James priority, we believe 
the two-stage mind model is better named “Jamesian” free will.  
Dennett makes his version of a two-stage model very clear. And he defends it with six 
excellent reasons that are more persuasive than those of any other philosopher or scientist. 
   
The model of decision making I am proposing has the following feature: when we 
are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator68 whose output is 
to some degree undetermined produces a series of considerations, some of which 
may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or 
unconsciously). Those considerations that are selected by the agent as having a 
more than negligible bearing on the decision then figure in a reasoning process, 
and if the agent is in the main reasonable, those considerations ultimately serve as 
predictors and explicators of the agent's final decision.69 
 
Dennett then gives six excellent reasons why this is the kind of free will that libertarians say they 
want. They are stated more clearly and convincingly than any libertarian philosopher and it is 
surprising that more free will libertarians did not accept this view. 
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   First...The intelligent selection, rejection, and weighing of the considerations 
that do occur to the subject is a matter of intelligence making the difference… 
   Second, I think it installs indeterminism in the right place for the libertarian, if 
there is a right place at all…  
   Third...from the point of view of biological engineering, it is just more efficient 
and in the end more rational that decision making should occur in this way…  
   A fourth observation in favor of the model is that it permits moral education to 
make a difference, without making all of the difference…  
   Fifth - and I think this is perhaps the most important thing to be said in favor of 
this model - it provides some account of our important intuition that we are the 
authors of our moral decisions…  
   Finally, the model I propose points to the multiplicity of decisions that encircle 
our moral decisions and suggests that in many cases our ultimate decision as to 
which way to act is less important phenomenologically as a contributor to our 
sense of free will than the prior decisions affecting our deliberation process itself: 
the decision, for instance, not to consider any further, to terminate deliberation; or 
the decision to ignore certain lines of inquiry.  
  These prior and subsidiary decisions contribute, I think, to our sense of ourselves 
as responsible free agents, roughly in the following way: I am faced with an 
important decision to make, and after a certain amount of deliberation, I say to 
myself: "That's enough. I've considered this matter enough and now I'm going to 
act," in the full knowledge that I could have considered further, in the full 
knowledge that the eventualities may prove that I decided in error, but with the 
acceptance of responsibility in any case.70 
 
We might add a seventh reason to Dennett’s otherwise comprehensive list, that this kind of free 
will is a process that could have evolved naturally from lower animals. The most recent 
contributor of a two-stage model establishes that fact.  
 
MARTIN HEISENBERG (1940-) 









The most recent thinker to describe a two-stage model is Martin Heisenberg (son of 
physicist Werner), chair of the University of Wurzburg’s BioZentrum genetics and neurobiology 
section. Since the indeterminacy principle was his father’s work, Heisenberg’s position that the 
physical universe is no longer determined and that nature is inherently unpredictable comes as no 
surprise. What is unusual is that Heisenberg finds evidence of free behavior in animals, including 
some very simple ones such as Drosophila, on which he is a world expert. Heisenberg argues for 
some randomness even in unicellular bacteria, followed by more lawful behaviors such as 
moving toward food. 
 
Evidence of randomly generated action — action that is distinct from reaction 
because it does not depend upon external stimuli — can be found in unicellular 
organisms. Take the way the bacterium Escherichia coli moves. It has a flagellum 
that can rotate around its longitudinal axis in either direction: one way drives the 
bacterium forward, the other causes it to tumble at random so that it ends up 
facing in a new direction ready for the next phase of forward motion. This 
‘random walk’ can be modulated by sensory receptors, enabling the bacterium to 
find food and the right temperature.71 
 
In higher organisms, the brain still may include elements that do a random walk among 
options for action. The capability to generate new and unpredictable behaviors would have great 
survival value, and would likely be incorporated in higher organisms: 
 
the activation of behavioural modules is based on the interplay between chance and 
lawfulness in the brain. Insufficiently equipped, insufficiently informed and short of time, 
animals have to find a module that is adaptive. Their brains, in a kind of random walk, 
continuously preactivate, discard and reconfigure their options, and evaluate their 
possible short-term and long-term consequences. 
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The physiology of how this happens has been little investigated. But there is plenty of 
evidence that an animal’s behaviour cannot be reduced to responses. For example, my lab 
has demonstrated that fruit flies, in situations they have never encountered, can modify 
their expectations about the consequences of their actions. They can solve problems that 
no individual fly in the evolutionary history of the species has solved before. Our 
experiments show that they actively initiate behaviour.72 
 
Heisenberg’s combination of some randomness followed by some "lawful" behavior is the latest 
version of William James’s two-stage model. We now have empirical evidence for behavioral 
freedom in many animals. James would have been pleased. 
Most importantly, Heisenberg’s work shows us that human free will may have evolved 
naturally from the behavioral freedom of the lower animals. Free will is not a gift of God to 
humanity that marks humans as different from other animals. And it is not a metaphysical 
mystery that requires an immaterial mind distinct from the human body. 73 
 
HOW BEHAVIORAL FREEDOM EVOLVED TO BECOME FREE WILL 
 
Robert J. Richards says that the key to understanding how James applied the Darwinian 
perspective to the mental realm is to see it as “two different sources: spontaneous variations, 
which do not mirror their causes; and a selection by external circumstances.”74 James’s two-stage 
model is clear in his description of “inner” and “outer” steps. Richards says that “James insisted 
that ‘the variation or inner relation does not ‘correspond’ with its cause…the outward relation 
has a perfectly definite function: to take the variation once made and preserve or destroy it.’”75 
So how can James’s mental selection process differ from Martin Heisenberg’s lawlike selection 
in lower animals? 
We can distinguish four evolutionary levels between the lowest and highest forms of 
selection. Note that the sources of spontaneous variation are the same on all four levels. They are 
driven by noise and errors in the biological system, some of which result from quantum 
indeterminacy. 
1. Instinctive selection - for organisms with only genetically inherited behaviors. 
 








2. Learned selection - for organisms that remember their past to guide their 
future. 
 
3. Predictive selection - for animals with foresight who anticipate consequences. 
 
4. Reflective and normative selection - for humans who can think twice, then 
think again about the thought, evaluating it in the light of personal and societal 
values.  
 





The great problem of free will, as William James saw it, is not to make it compatible with 
determinism, but to make it compatible with chance as the source of novelty76 and alternative 
possibilities. James would therefore today be called an “incompabilist” on free will.  But for him 
free will is incompatible only with predeterminism.  It is compatible with determination of our 
actions by our reasons, motives, and feelings as made plain by James’s colleague Dickinson 
Miller and in later two-stage models.  This determination requirement is the reason most 
philosophers are compatibilists today.  Many of them might accept James’s free-will model. 
James could of course not know of quantum indeterminacy, but quantum chance is now 
irreducibly real. So the problem today for free will is to show that such chance leaves us with an 
adequate determinism. It was the fantastic accuracy of Newtonian classical physics predictions 
that led us in the first place to the illusion of strict causal determinism. Quantum mechanics is 
even more accurate than classical mechanics.  Whether in planets orbiting the sun, or nerve cells 
firing to move our hands, quantum randomness is for the most part negligible in the macroscopic 
universe. 
We therefore can, as did James, admit some indeterminism. We need not permit it to 
make our actions and decisions random events, as some determinists and compatibilists 
mistakenly fear. We must also limit determinism, but not eliminate it, as libertarians mistakenly 
think necessary.  Our decisions must be adequately determined following evaluation of 
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alternative possibilities provided in part by chance. The Jamesian two-stage model for free will, a 
combination of chance and adequate determination, is the leading contender for a resolution of 
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